The late origins of the timeline, or: three paradoxes explained.

We are all used to drawing straight lines to represent time, and above them, we plot historical events or physical or economic data. What to us is a self-evident convention, is however of an astonishingly recent date: it emerged only in the second half of the eighteenth century. To us, this late date seems paradoxical and cries out for an explanation. How else did earlier periods measure change, if not as a function of time? it will be argued that since Antiquity, time was taken to measure change, and change to occur in space. 'Our' idea of representing time as an independent dimension would have seemed aberrant. But then, a second issue arises. Did not medieval natural philosophers employ timelines, Oresme's diagram of the mean speed theorem being the most famous case? However, as will be shown, our interpretation of his diagram is probably wrong. This insight, in turn, takes care of a third paradox, namely Galileo's initial inability to represent the law of free fall correctly. This article will document that the timeline first emerged in the late sixteenth century in works on chronology, made its first appearance in physics in Galileo's diagrams, and had its general breakthrough in the eighteenth century.

The experience of reading philosophy.

Reading is not a peripheral philosophical pastime; it constitutes most of what we do when we do philosophy. And the experience of reading philosophy is much more than just a series of interpretative acts: the philosopher-reader is subject to, among other things, sensations, passions, emendations, and transformations. In this essay, I argue that a full account of philosophical reading should outline some of the sociological structures that determine how different communities of philosophers (within and outside the academy) construct such experiences, as well as describe in detail the ways in which philosophers encounter (or fail to encounter) truths while reading. It should, that is, describe ways in which philosophy acts upon readers and the various effects that result.

Kant's pragmatic use of reason from a sociological point of view: Third way or methodological impasse?

The paper focuses on the relevance of Kant's anthropologically oriented idea of the pragmatic use of reason for specific theoretical approaches in sociology. As I show in the first part, Kant's explicit presence in 20th-century sociology does not refer much to his anthropology and specifically to its cornerstone - the pragmatic use of reason which establishes a subtle connection between the theoretical and practical functions of reason. As an instrument for gaining systematic knowledge about the social world and ourselves as beings both passively and actively involved in this process, Kant's pragmatic use of reason serves a specific form of the theoretical use of reason. At the same time, it embodies a kind of practical reasoning concerning the "general welfare" in the social sphere. Building on the key arguments in the first part, I then address the question of whether we can view Kant's pragmatic approach as a possible third way for sociology today, beyond the simplifying opposition of 'theoretical' normativity and 'realistic' empiricism, and whether this third way can help us in clearing specific sociological issues. Here, I focus on two examples, namely the use of Kant's notion of "unsocial sociability" in Ralf Dahrendorf's conflict theory and on the criticism of Kant's cosmopolitanism in Ulrich Beck's reformed sociology of cosmopolitanism.

Perspectivas filosóficas a partir del problema del suicidio / Philosophical perspectives from the problem of suicide / Perspectivas filosóficas a partir do problema do suicídio

Resumen Varias de las actuales discusiones bioéticas parten del supuesto de que tenemos absoluto dominio/disposición sobre nuestro cuerpo. Bajo la tesis de la autonomía, del dominio de la vida propia y de la libertad para hacer cualquier cosa, al menos con nuestro cuerpo, se suele justificar la bondad o legitimidad de actos como el suicidio y la eutanasia. Supuesto lo anterior, el trabajo aborda la cuestión de la naturaleza de la disposición -principal atributo del dominio o propiedad- sobre el cuerpo. Se argumentará sobre la base de la teoría de Tomás de Aquino y de la exposición de Immanuel Kant, muchas veces consideradas, erróneamente a mi juicio, como doctrinas rivales. El escrito estará orientado a revisar las relaciones del moderno principio de autonomía con la problemática de la moralidad del suicidio.

Abstract Many of the actual bioethical discussions start from the assumption that we have absolute dominance/disposition over our body. Based on the thesis of autonomy, control over one's own life and the freedom to do anything, at least with one's body, the goodness or legitimacy of acts such as suicide and euthanasia are often justified. Considering the last statements, this paper seeks to approach the question of the nature of the disposition -main attribute of dominion or property- over the body. It will be argued on the basis of Thomas Aquinas' theory and Immanuel Kant's exposition, often wrongly considered, in my opinion, as rival doctrines. The whole writing will be oriented to review the relations of the modern principle of autonomy with the problem of the morality of suicide.

Resumo Várias das atuais discussões bioéticas partem do pressuposto de que temos absoluto domínio/disposição sobre nosso corpo. Sob a tese da autonomia, do domínio da vida própria e da liberdade para fazer qualquer coisa, ao menos com nosso corpo, costuma-se justificar a bondade ou legitimidade de atos como o suicídio e a eutanásia. Levando em consideração o anterior, este trabalho pretende abordar a questão da natureza da disposição -principal atributo do domínio ou da propriedade- sobre o corpo. Argumenta-se com base na teoria de Tomás de Aquino e na exposição de Immanuel Kant, muitas vezes conceituadas, erroneamente, em minha opinião, como doutrinas rivais. Este texto estará orientado a revisar as relações do moderno princípio de autonomia com a problemática da moralidade do suicídio.

Varieties Of Evolved Forms Of Consciousness, Including Mathematical Consciousness.

I shall introduce a complex, apparently unique, cross-disciplinary approach to understanding consciousness, especially ancient forms of mathematical consciousness, based on joint work with Jackie Chappell (Birmingham Biosciences) on the Meta-Configured Genome (MCG) theory. All known forms of consciousness (apart from recent very simple AI forms) are products of biological evolution, in some cases augmented by products of social, or technological evolution. Forms of consciousness differ between organisms with different sensory mechanisms, needs and abilities; and in complex animals can vary across different stages of development before and after birth or hatching or pupation, and before or after sexual and other kinds of maturity (or senility). Those forms can differ across individuals with different natural talents and environments, some with and some without fully functional sense organs or motor control functions (in humans: hearing, sight, touch, taste, smell, proprioception and other senses), along with mechanisms supporting meta-cognitive functions such as recollection, expectation, foreboding, error correction, and so forth, and varying forms of conscious control differing partly because of physical differences, such as conjoined twins sharing body parts. Forms of consciousness can also differ across individuals in different cultures with different shared theories, and social practices (e.g., art-forms, musical traditions, religions, etc.). There are many unanswered questions about such varieties of consciousness in products of biological evolution. Most of the details are completely ignored by most philosophers and scientists who focus only on a small subset of types of human consciousness-resulting in shallow theories. Immanuel Kant was deeper than most, though his insights, especially insights into mathematical consciousness tend to be ignored by recent philosophers and scientists, for bad reasons. This paper, partly inspired by Turing's 1952 paper on chemistry-based morphogenesis, supporting William James' observation that all known forms of consciousness must have been products of biological evolution in combination with other influences, attempts to provide (still tentative and incomplete) foundations for a proper study of the variety of biological and non-biological forms of consciousness, including the types of mathematical consciousness identified by Kant in 1781.

Hans Reichenbach's and C.I. Lewis's Kantian philosophies of science.

Recent work in the history of philosophy of science details the Kantianism of philosophers often thought opposed to one another, e.g., Hans Reichenbach, C.I. Lewis, Rudolf Carnap, and Thomas Kuhn. Historians of philosophy of science in the last two decades have been particularly interested in the Kantianism of Reichenbach, Carnap, and Kuhn, and more recently, of Lewis. While recent historical work focuses on recovering the threatened-to-be-forgotten Kantian themes of early twentieth-century philosophy of science, we should not elide the differences between the Kantian strands running throughout this work. In this paper, I disentangle a few of these strands in the work of Reichenbach and Lewis focusing especially on their theories of relativized, constitutive a priori principles in empirical knowledge. In particular, I highlight three related differences between Reichenbach and Lewis concerning their motivations in analyzing scientific knowledge and scientific practice, their differing conceptions of constitutivity, and their relativization of constitutive a priori principles. In light of these differences, I argue Lewis's Kantianism is more similar to Kuhn's Kantianism than Reichenbach's, and so might be of more contemporary relevance to social and practice-based approaches to the philosophy of science.

Skin color and phlogiston Immanuel Kant's racism in context.

Although much attention has already been paid to Kant's ideas on race, more research is needed to determine the sources that he used to support his portrayal of non-white races. A comprehension of the intellectual context gives us the opportunity to see the way in which Kant wished to contribute to discussions on inheritable human characteristics and the inferiority of certain races. This article will emphasize the relevance of the views of Joseph Priestley and Alexander Wilson for Kant's hypothesis on the relation between phlogiston and the black race. This allows us to comprehend the methodology that Kant prescribed for natural history and its consequences for his understanding of the inferiority of the black race.

Richard Dean: The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory : Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. x + 267. Cloth, £28.12.

This is critical review of Richard Dean' book, The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory. Dean's book was evaluated, and some of his interpretations of Kant were critiqued. However, it concludes that Dean's book is illuminating especially, as regards the distinction he made between consent and informed consent and their roles in biomedical practice.

Kant, organisms, and representation.

Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant's various remarks about the essential properties of living things generalize to organisms as such. This, in turn, generates a puzzle. Kant repeatedly claims that the capacity for representation is essential to the nature of a living thing. If he does not distinguish between living things and organisms, then how might the capacity for representation be essential to the latter? Drawing on the writings of Kant and his contemporaries, I reconstruct a framework within which representational capacities might conceivably be thought to play this role. On this view, what distinguishes an organism from mechanically explicable products of nature is its capacity for endogenous behavior that is instinctual and representationally mediated.

Epigenesis in Kant: Recent reconsiderations.

Epigenesis has become a far more exciting issue in Kant studies recently, especially with the publication of Jennifer Mensch's Kant' Organicism. In my commentary, I propose to clarify my own position on epigenesis relative to that of Mensch and others by once again considering the discourse of epigenesis in the wider eighteenth century. Historically, I maintain that Kant was never fully an epigenesist because he feared its materialist implications. This makes it highly unlikely that he drew heavily, as other interpreters like Dupont and Huneman have suggested, on Caspar Friedrich Wolff for his ultimate theory of "generic preformation." In order to situate more precisely what Kant made of epigenesis, I distinguish his metaphysical use, as elaborated by Mensch, from his view of it as a theory for life science. In that light, I raise questions about the scope and authority of philosophy vis a vis natural science.

Helmholtz's Kant revisited (Once more). The all-pervasive nature of Helmholtz's struggle with Kant's Anschauung.

In this analysis, the classical problem of Hermann von Helmholtz's (1821-1894) Kantianism is explored from a particular vantage point, that to my knowledge, has not received the attention it deserves notwithstanding its possible key role in disentangling Helmholtz's relation to Kant's critical project. More particularly, we will focus on Helmholtz's critical engagement with Kant's concept of intuition [Anschauung] and (the related issue of) his dissatisfaction with Kant's doctrinal dualism. In doing so, it soon becomes clear that both (i) crucially mediated Helmholtz's idiosyncratic appropriation and criticism of (certain aspects of) Kant's critical project, and (ii) can be considered as a common denominator in a variety of issues that are usually addressed separately under the general header of (the problem of) Helmholtz's Kantianism. The perspective offered in this analysis can not only shed interesting new light on some interpretive issues that have become commonplace in discussions on Helmholtz's Kantianism, but also offers a particular way of connecting seemingly unrelated dimensions of Helmholtz's engagement with Kant's critical project (e.g. Helmholtz's views on causality and space). Furthermore, it amounts to the rather surprising conclusion that Helmholtz's most drastic revision of Kant's project pertains to his assumption of free will as a formal condition of experience and knowledge.

Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay.

In this paper, I give a Kantian answer to the question whether and why it would be inappropriate to blame people suffering from mental disorders that fall within the schizophrenia spectrum. I answer this question by reconstructing Kant's account of mental disorder, in particular his explanation of psychotic symptoms. Kant explains these symptoms in terms of various types of cognitive impairment. I show that this explanation is plausible and discuss Kant's claim that the unifying feature of the symptoms is the patient's inability to enter into an exchange of reasons with others. After developing a Kantian Quality of Will Thesis, I analyze some real life cases. Firstly, I argue that delusional patients who are unable to enter into an exchange of epistemic reasons are exempted from doxastic rather than moral responsibility. They are part of the moral community and exonerated from moral blame only if their actions do not express a lack of good will. Secondly, I argue that disorganized patients who are unable to form intentions and to make plans are exempted from moral responsibility because they do not satisfy the conditions for agency.

Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.

Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic - whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard's transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.

Reconsidering Kantian arguments against organ selling.

Referring to Kant's arguments addressing the moral relationship between our bodies and ourselves is quite common in contemporary debate about organ selling, although he does not provide us with any specific arguments related to this debate. It is widely argued that the most promising way to show the moral impermissibility of organ selling is to mount an argument on Kantian grounds. This paper asks whether it is possible to argue coherently against organ selling in a Kantian framework. It will be shown that by mounting the argument on Kantian grounds no compelling argument can be given against sale of organs, either because the arguments apply to donation of organs, too, or the arguments are not convincing for other independent reasons. In the first section, it will be argued that donation and selling are not distinguishable in a Kantian framework, since the concern about commodification of the body and its parts shall be raised by both actions. In the second section, some contemporary accounts inspired by Kant will be presented and discussed separately. It will be argued that the reasons for promoting organ donation while arguing against selling clash with each other in an unconvincing way.

Rehabilitating the regulative use of reason: Kant on empirical and chemical laws.

In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant asserts that laws of nature "carry with them an expression of necessity" (A159/B198). There is, however, widespread interpretive disagreement regarding the nature and source of the necessity of empirical laws of natural sciences in Kant's system. It is especially unclear how chemistry-a science without a clear, straightforward connection to the a priori principles of the understanding-could contain such genuine, empirical laws. Existing accounts of the necessity of causal laws unfortunately fail to illuminate the possibility of non-physical laws. In this paper, I develop an alternative, 'ideational' account of natural laws, according to which ideas of reason necessitate the laws of some non-physical sciences. Chemical laws, for instance, are grounded on ideas of the elements, and the chemist aims to reduce her phenomena to these elements via experimentation. Although such ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason's theoretical ends: the unification and explanation of the cognitions of science.

Sobre a fundamentação da psicologia racional no século XVIII: uma análise do confronto entre Mendelssohn e Kant acerca da simplicidade da alma / On the grounding of rationalist psychology in the XVIII century: an analysis of the confrontation between Mendelssohn and Kant about the simplicity of the soul

O argumento da simplicidade da alma tem uma elevada aceitação entre os filósofos racionalistas que objetivam fundamentar a tese da imortalidade da alma. Este é o caso de Mendelssohn, que, ao revigorar o Fédon de Platão, aprimora este argumento, bem como a demonstração da incorruptibilidade da alma. Entendido como uma notável referência no Iluminismo alemão, confrontamos seus argumentos com as objeções kantianas às provas teóricas da imortalidade da alma. Assim, constatamos que seu argumento da simplicidade da alma pode ser compreendido entre aqueles que Kant qualifica como paralogismo transcendental, e que sua defesa da incorruptibilidade da alma não se sustenta, quando se respeitam as condições de uso objetivo dos conceitos puros do entendimento. Ao articularmos estas discussões, podemos esclarecer a sagacidade de Mendelssohn e ressaltar a precisão das objeções de Kant, as quais são decisivas no desenvolvimento histórico da psicologia.(AU)

The argument of the simplicity of the soul has a high acceptance among rationalist philosophers who aim to substantiate the thesis of the soul’s immortality. This is the case of Mendelssohn, who invigorates Plato’s Phaedo and improves this argument, as well as the demonstration of the incorruptibility of the soul. Since his work is a remarkable reference in the German Enlightenment, we confronted his arguments with Kant’s objections to the theoretical proofs of the immortality of the soul. This allowed us to verify that his argument about the simplicity of the soul can be between those that Kant describes as transcendental paralogism and his defense of the incorruptibility of the soul fails when the conditions of the objective use of the pure concepts of the understanding are fulfilled. Having articulated these discussions, we could clarify Mendelssohn’s sagacity and emphasize the accuracy of Kant’s objections, which are decisive in the historical development of psychology.(AU)

The Wolffian roots of Kant's teleology.

Kant's teleology as presented in the Critique of Judgment is commonly interpreted in relation to the late eighteenth-century biological research of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. In the present paper, I show that this interpretative perspective is incomplete. Understanding Kant's views on teleology and biology requires a consideration of the teleological and biological views of Christian Wolff and his rationalist successors. By reconstructing the Wolffian roots of Kant's teleology, I identify several little known sources of Kant's views on biology. I argue that one of Kant's main contributions to eighteenth-century debates on biology consisted in demarcating biology from metaphysics. Kant rejected Wolffian views on the hierarchy of sciences, according to which propositions specifying the functions of organisms are derived from theological truths. In addition, Kant argued that organic self-organization necessitates a teleological description in order to show that self-organization does not support materialism. By demarcating biology and metaphysics, Kant made a small yet important contribution to establishing biology as a science.

Los principios de la homeopatía, a medio camino entre lo antiguo y lo moderno / The principles of homeopathy, halfway between the old and new

Los críticos de la Homeopatía han señalado que esta materia carece de bases científicas y que hay pocas evidencias documentales que den cuenta de su eficacia.El presente trabajo es un ensayo que coloca al lector en el contexto histórico,filosófico y político que nació la Homeopatía, como un punto de partida que despuésse transforma en una exposición en la que se discute si la medicina configuradapor Samuel Hahnemann es antigua o moderna. El autor dedica gran parte de su ensayo a destacar algunas ideas fundamentales de Crítica de la razón pura, obra del célebre filosofo alemán (1724-1804) Immanuel Kant,y señala cómo, a partir de ellas, es que la medicina alopática empezó a interesarse por atender las consecuencias de la enfermedad y no la enfermedad misma. Kant actuó de buena fe y coloco en la mesa de discusión ideas revolucionarias que dieron pie a la sistematización de las ciencias modernas. Sin embargo, ello no significa, señala el autor de este artículo, que algunos conceptos utilizados en Homeopatía, como “totalidad”, “organismo” o “fuerza vital” deban ser ignorados a priori. (AU)

Critics of homeopathy have pointed out that this matter has no scientific basis andthe existing evidence is too insufficient to account for their effectiveness. This paper is a trial that places the reader in the historical, philosophical and political in which homeopathy came as a starting point, this point then transformed into an exhibition in which it is discussed whether the regime of Samuel Hahnemann is ancient or modern. The author devotes much of his trial will highlight some fundamental ideasof “Critique of Pure Reason”, by the famous German philosopher (1724-1804) ImmanuelKant, and shows how, from them, is that allopathic medicine became interestedto address the consequences of the disease and not the disease itself. Kant acted in good faith and placed on the table for discussion revolutionary ideas that led to the systematization of modern science. However, this does not mean, says the author of this article, some concepts used in homeopathy as “all”, “body” or “life force” should be ignored a priori.(AU)

Los principios de la homeopatía, a medio camino entre lo antiguo y lo moderno / The principles of homeopathy, halfway between the old and new

Los críticos de la Homeopatía han señalado que esta materia carece de bases científicas y que hay pocas evidencias documentales que den cuenta de su eficacia.El presente trabajo es un ensayo que coloca al lector en el contexto histórico,filosófico y político que nació la Homeopatía, como un punto de partida que despuésse transforma en una exposición en la que se discute si la medicina configuradapor Samuel Hahnemann es antigua o moderna. El autor dedica gran parte de su ensayo a destacar algunas ideas fundamentales de Crítica de la razón pura, obra del célebre filosofo alemán (1724-1804) Immanuel Kant,y señala cómo, a partir de ellas, es que la medicina alopática empezó a interesarse por atender las consecuencias de la enfermedad y no la enfermedad misma. Kant actuó de buena fe y coloco en la mesa de discusión ideas revolucionarias que dieron pie a la sistematización de las ciencias modernas. Sin embargo, ello no significa, señala el autor de este artículo, que algunos conceptos utilizados en Homeopatía, como “totalidad”, “organismo” o “fuerza vital” deban ser ignorados a priori.

Critics of homeopathy have pointed out that this matter has no scientific basis andthe existing evidence is too insufficient to account for their effectiveness. This paper is a trial that places the reader in the historical, philosophical and political in which homeopathy came as a starting point, this point then transformed into an exhibition in which it is discussed whether the regime of Samuel Hahnemann is ancient or modern. The author devotes much of his trial will highlight some fundamental ideasof “Critique of Pure Reason”, by the famous German philosopher (1724-1804) ImmanuelKant, and shows how, from them, is that allopathic medicine became interestedto address the consequences of the disease and not the disease itself. Kant acted in good faith and placed on the table for discussion revolutionary ideas that led to the systematization of modern science. However, this does not mean, says the author of this article, some concepts used in homeopathy as “all”, “body” or “life force” should be ignored a priori.

Various theories on cosmology and its evolution in western medicine and Chinese medicine / 中华中医药杂志

Philosophy has exerted greatly influences on both western medicine and Chinese medicine,both medicines have quite distinctive and interesting recognitions on illness and human being which reflect their own cosmology and its evolutionary progress.A renown scholar ZHU Xi in the Song dynasty of China has reached the peak of neo-Confucianism and elaborated a lot of theories on Chinese cosmology by summarizing scientific achievements at that time;while Immanuel Kant has done very similar to the western world of cosmology.However,their theories make obvious different.As far as the evolution of humankind is concerned,Karl Popper has contributed his distinguished idea that the brain is the center for evolution.To this point,the theory of Chinese medicine,regarding the human-brain as the Ni Wan,ocean of the marrow.Furthermore,the system that the Ren Meridian and the Du Meridian corresponding to human upright vertebrae column in traditional Chinese medicine,makes an in-depth sense,too.